

# Security Challenges in Somalia: Causes and Consequences

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## Abstract

Security is a vital component for each sovereign country, like in the case of the Federal Republic of Somalia. As one of the powers in Africa, or as known as the Horn of Africa, Somalia has its own difficulties and problems within the scope of international relations and internal security. As a matter of fact these problems are preventing Somalia's national development. Global society is in a constant transformation and therefore, an interdependent system has been launched. Thereby, countries became more dependent and each action taken may affect another country which is nearby or hundreds of kilometers away. Thus, the outcome of this system is that it is not possible to stay isolated, so that strengthening intergovernmental relations by creating strong bonds and policies with other countries are crucial necessities in order to survive within this system. Since Somalia situates in a continent which possesses vast possibilities and rich sources, fortified international policies will play vital roles as a significant component for security as well as for the national growth. This study aims to shed a light on the various challenges that Somalia has been confronted with and is in challenge with by the perspective of security concept and its evolution throughout the years. After stressing these concepts, historical background of the country and challenges it preserves within itself which is preventing the development will be argued. Somalia's political challenges are going to be broadly discussed under this research. Finally, this thesis supports the idea of reconciliation and reunification to improve and strengthen national development in Somalia.

**Keywords: Security, challenges, Alshabab, Piracy, Somalia**

## I. INTRODUCTION

This study is a solemn treatise among many academic works aimed to present a logical analysis for the current sociopolitical problems of Somalia. The study tries to the best of its ability to present the origins, breadth and width of the security challenges that Somalia faces. Above all, it presents its arguments from an indigenous point of view which is quasi-independent of some of the literature presented by other Western scholars who maybe defiant of some very fine information and who might be missing a few fine points in their analogies. Furthermore, this study elucidates on the fundamental needs to address the root causes of the Somalia problem beginning from its indigenous identity before the arrival of the colonialists. Then it examines the different administrations in power and the political cultures they established by which it believes that regime type and governance might be accountable for the current collapsed nature of the country.

Additionally, it looks the current dissolution of the country and the many nation building attempts that have been made both locally at the Somali level, at the regional levels under the auspices of the African Union and the International Community.

This study will try to create a basis for Somalia to gain, and strengthen its resilience, peace, security and improve its national development by asking what actions Somalia can take and the possible application strategies of these actions.

Regardless of the many troubles that the Somali people face, there is still hope and strong prospects and promise for national unity and growth in the war-torn country. Within that framework, the goal of this research is to analyze in detail the security challenges facing Somalia in the current period.

Furthermore, this study would like to present a logical explanation of the problem as it sees it and consider the religious tension currently being instigated by Al-Shabaab and shall question its importance to the political, economic, military and environmental formations of the restrained country. Moreover, this study shall present to the entire community the need for the deradicalization of the extremist militant groups who fight against the installation of peace and serenity.

## II. CONCEPTUAL REVIEW OF SECURITY STUDIES

Security is a concept which maintains a vital importance for a sovereign country. The concept is still contested and there is no any existing consensus yet, regarding the definition and the elements of it. For that matter common ground for discussion is challenging due to the conceptual vagueness. The literature provides a variety of definitions of security, which basically is a proof of different approaches in order to understand the content and meaning of the notion. The stated concept can be used while enucleating several situations and specific aspects. For instance, different definitions are being used while defining human security, national security and as well as the security of goods and services.

Before discussing the subject in detail, in this study the conceptual definitions of security shall be considered from mostly an academic point of view. Therefore, understanding what they are and rightly grouping them according to their distinct categories simplifies the worrisome academic problem. Therefore, before diving into, it is good to know that finding the most appropriate

definition of security has become a challenge as many scholars prefer to define it in the light of national security rather than its true meaning (Baldwin, 1997). Baldwin (1997) adds that the concept of security has many inclusive elements which are interrelated and carry similar attentive importance. Furthermore, he thinks that there might just be another class of scholarly explanation between security and power, a reason why finding the right definition is really worrisome. Boemckern and Schetter (2009) define security as “security is conceived as something that can be objectively known and thus needs to be diligently measured, monitored and improved upon by means of reason and scientific inquiry” (Boemcken and Schetter, 2009).

Hofreiter (2015) proposes two good definitions which are cited in her own words. They read “security is a state in which the risks and the threats resulting from them are minimized or eliminated. Secondly, security is a state in which the given object does not feel endangered in terms of its legal interests (Hofreiter (2015).

According to Örmeci (2010) security studies date back right to the ancient Greeks who wrote about the security of the city state. More so, the writings of Thucydides who wrote about the Peloponnesian wars broadly explain the imperative need for this study in international relations and also shows that it was already an impassable subject (Örmeci, 2010). Considering this development, Örmeci (2010) adds that security studies might be well understood if they are approached from three levels of analysis at it is within the framework of neoliberal studies of international relations.

The first level of analysis is the state-to-state analysis whereby states appear as the foremost actors of international affairs and interact with other states in order to meet their needs and interests (Kolodziej 2004, cited in Örmeci, 2010). Secondly, states might interact with other non-state actors such as transnational civil societies of other countries (Kolodziej 2004, cited in Örmeci, 2010).

Thirdly, states interact with international organizations such as the World Health Organization, the World Trade Organization etc. (Kolodziej 2004, cited in Örmeci, 2010). With this explanation the stage is set to introduce Buzan’s description of security studies. However, this study thinks that it might be mindful to add that during the cold war, security studies and security itself was a priceless jewel which was handled by military experts and military security then was a substantial need.

However, as for what concerns the systematic categorization of security studies Buzan (1983) is reckoned to be one of the best if not the pioneer of modern security analysis with his five levels of security threats. Barry Buzan (1983) viewed security on a larger scale than the classical perspective. He also introduced the concept of ‘Comprehensive security’. Emphasizing the integrity of security and extended definition of Security. According to Buzan (1983) security should be addressed from five different levels and according to how states are threatened. His levels are; 1) political threats, 2) military threats, 3) economic threats, and 4) societal threats and 5) environmental threats.

### III. HISTORICAL CONTEXT TO CONTEMPORARY SOMALIA

In order to understand the conflict history of Somalia, the root causes have to be analyzed chronologically. At the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Somalia was divided into five regions which were being under the control of colonial states such as France, Italy and Great Britain.

However, the Somali People did not bow down to the colonialists and showed a serious resistance against them. The War of Liberation against the imperialists began and continued under the leadership of Somali nationalists and religious scholars. After the decolonization era, Somalia declared its independence in 1960 and became ‘The Republic of Somalia’. Although independence was gained, there were conflicts amongst the rulers of the decolonization process, therefore, instability manifested itself.

In 1960 Northern and Southern regions united to form the independent Somalia Republic under a civilian government led by Aden Abdullah Osman the first elected Somali President. The president constituted civilian democratic government from 1960-1967, however, the president Osman was defeated in elections by his former prime minister, Abdirashid Ali and stepped down. This was the first peaceful transfer of power in Africa and today Somalia is considered as Africa's first democracy (Samatar, 2016) After two years in power in 1969, President Sharmarke was assassinated by a member of his own bodyguards. Shortly after the president, Sharmarke was assassinated Siad Barre took the control with a military coup in October of 1969.

The military regime that came to power dissolved the parliament and the Supreme Court, and suspended the constitution (Ingiriis, 2016). The Barre regime became increasingly oppressive and violent in the later parts of its reign. Siad Barre once said ‘I came to power by a gun; only the gun can make me go’, (Abdullahi, 2001).

The regime government was finally overthrown in a bloody civil war waged by clan-based guerrillas in 1991. The collapse of Somalia formally began in January 1991 pursuant to the collapse of the Barre government. Consequently, Somalia is a country and its people have witnessed almost three decades without strong functioning governments which have rendered many of its necessary institutions almost non-existent.

### IV. THE SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE CONTEXT OF SOMALIA

Somalia’s security challenges have several root causes in different dimensions. Security is a notion which cannot be established within this territory since its colonization, decolonization and post-colonization processes. Although, he was a dictator and practiced bad governance, during Siad Barre’s regime an order was relatively provided by a central government via formal institutions, and violent acts such as massacres were not on the table. After the collapse of the Barre government which was followed by the incompetent policies of the Transitional Federal Government on ensuring authority, chaos dominated the country. Within this chaos, economic investments stopped, trade rates decreased and deploy market ran down. Therefore, it is not hard to

state the fact that opportunity shortage was a dominant factor at the time of chaos. This opportunity structure played an important role and became a motivation for Somalis to join certain non-state and illegal actors such as pirates, terrorist groups or criminal gangs. To this respect, individuals who participated in these illegal groups acquired different motivations. Seeing that especially for the most of the Al-Shabaab members, Islamic ideology was the starting point, but the fact remains that there was a significant participation of these individuals to the illegal entities just for ‘play to pay’ (Paul, Clarke and Serena, 2014).

#### **A. Political Causes of the Insecurity**

Since the Somali State collapsed in 1991 Somalia has been cited as a real-world example of an anarchist stateless society and a country with no formal legal system, until 2004, when the Transitional Federal Government was formed, (Gentleman, Jeffrey, 2007)

After the collapse of the Barre government judicial system as well collapsed with any other formal system which has been established before. The International Community has been engaged at both diplomatic and also military based levels to help resolve the conflict in Somalia. Nevertheless, the focus was on national level capacity building, peace building, peacekeeping and reconciliation. Although the constant flux of international help into Somalia, it remained still in the middle of a conflict zone, and the engagement attempts have helped to radicalize some other groups (Menkhaus, 2009). Therefore, these outcomes raised the question of the wrong perspective. The ‘national level capacity building’ was built on the sense of western-based democracy and in order to possess these kinds of concepts such as sustainability, government-centric management and liberalism the ‘State’ first has to possess this culture.

Somalia, since its early periods was under the strong influence of clan-based governance. Therefore, efforts regarding the national level capacity building were mainly aimed to impose a democratic government. But fundamental the obstacle lying in wait of the reconciliation was the clan culture. Somalia, as a country, does not require a culture of formal governance. In other words, trying to build a western-based culture is completely different hasn’t got that much similarities with the kind of democracy that will work for Somalia. So, the country continues to face a constant conflict, because the root causes have been detected and interpreted deficiently by the international scene. There is therefore, a need to return to the original and indigenous traditions, norms, cultures and precepts of the Somali people, which until now remains apparently, high above every Western proposal. Since this is the only identity value the Somalis see, then they must be served with it, however, creating a balance so that no region claims the ascendancy over the other for whatsoever reason.

The conflict and the security issues that it brings along are still present within these territories. This is because security can be sustained by stabilization and stabilization can only be provided by an organized government. This government’s style should not to be in a formal and western-based kind, hybrid political order which covers multiple sovereignties and institutional multiplicity concepts. This hybrid political concept allows a consideration of stabilization and peace building attempts in the aftermath of conflicts basing on historical perspective by considering the culture and fluidity of power and boundary shifts amongst formal and informal authorities (Stremlau, 2018). Hence, there are successful examples of hybrid political concepts which have been established by Somalis. For instance, Somaliland and Puntland are two state-like places that some level of security has been successfully established. Within these places, Somaliland and Puntland, a community-based police organization has been found in order to secure the society which is basically offering building blocks of the state.

After the fall of the Siad Barre military regime in 1991 Somali people and the International Community made tried many alternatives to re-establish national government. Reconciliation conferences were held several time and peacekeeping forces were sent to Somalia. However, nothing has changed. The United States sent peacekeeping forces namely the UNOSOM, one of these was the well-known peace-forcing mission ‘Operation Restore Hope’ in 1993 and also UNOSOM II. Today African Union Mission in Somalia is an active regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union and supported by the United Nations and European Union. Although newly structured ‘a post-transitional federal government’ has been launched amid the fact that Somalia remains one of the “most failed states” in the world (Fund for Peace, 2013). From 2004 to 2012 the Transitional Federal Government couldn’t manage any development at the administrative level or capacity building. TFG’s law making body Transitional Federal Parliament was incompetent to perform in spite of external supports and funds regarding capacity building. Although post-transitional government took TFG’s place in 2012, this newly structured government also has to develop capacity to exercise its authority over the territories of the country or even on delivering security and social services (Menkhaus, 2007). Post-transitional government is facing with stronger difficulty, the armed and better structured radical Islamist group, Al-Shabaab. This government is mainly keeping its place in the capital, Mogadishu, with the protection of African Union peacekeeping force.


#### **B. Military Threats**

When a security challenge is being mentioned within the subject matter of Somalia, the first group that comes into mind is Al-Shabaab. Despite the growing body of academic literature that seeks to explain the evolution of Al-Shabaab, the movement remains one of the least understood on the continent (Mohamed H. Ingiriis, 2018) Al-Shabaab is an armed, radical Islamist fraction of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which at the basis is the outgrowth of Al-Itihaad al Islamiya. ICU was functioning when the Transitional Federal Government was inaugurated, and it was in union with the local courts which compromising several parts and groups of the community opened doors for radical Islamists. After the inauguration of the Transitional Federal Government, they realized that they do not possess any authority although they are being recognized in the international scene. ICU has authority within the territory that the Transitional Federal Government should have. Therefore, the Transitional Federal Government made

alliances with Ethiopia, the United States and the African Union in order to annihilate ICU and take back the authority from them and this act ensued a detrimental fight against ICU. These attempts of the interim government radicalized groups who already had a tendency to it. Consequently, while ICU was splintered, a radical fraction of this union was established under the name of Al-Shabaab and by 2005, fighters (militants) of Al-Shabaab numbers raised approximately to 400. More so, the group furthered this acceleration of its number when Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia in late 2006.

Moreover, after this invasion of Ethiopian troops, who were against the expansion of ICU regarding religious concerns, Al-Shabaab had more motivation to conduct vital attacks. Their new aim evolved to spreading Islam in the society, protect the territories and repel the Ethiopian troops. So from 2007 to 2008, the amount and range of the attacks accelerated. Range was starting from ambush-style attacks, explosive devices, assassinations, and bombings. Al-Shabaab militants resisted and furthered their attacks until the Ethiopian troops stood still and retreated. So in early 2009 Ethiopian troops were forced to withdraw from the Somalia territory. Thus, Al-Shabaab took the management back of these territories and expanded their authorities.

This combat between Al-Shabaab and Ethiopian military forces was also supported by the U.S. and earned the reputation as the 'dirty war', by virtue of that both Al-Shabaab and Ethiopian troops did not abstain from accelerating the violence and means of attacks. Mostly, Al-Shabaab was using the method of suicide bombing, while the Ethiopians were responding back with the usage of white phosphorous bombs to demolish the rebel possessed neighborhoods as a whole (Menkhaus and Boucek, 2010). Today, although Al-Shabab is not as powerful as it was before, a wide area of Somalia is still under their rule. Areas which are under the Al-Shabaab management can be observed from the map below.



On the other hand Somalia, due to the long coasts and ports of the country, has always had the issue of piracy therefore; it is not a recent problem or a new security challenge. Fishing is an important source of income in Somalia. There is no institution that will protect the rights of fishermen due to civil wars and unrest in the country. Powerful states have benefited from this situation and illegally fished and somehow plundered the coasts of Somalia, despite their lack of rights. Piracy activities in the country initially emerged in order to prevent this situation. However, with the realization that it was much better to take the ships coming to the region hostage and ransom demand than fishing, the resistance that emerged as a reaction against the big states turned into piracy activity. So far, an anti-piracy task force with the UN, NATO, EU and Turkey's initiatives have been created in region but piracy problem still exists and threatens the security.

### **C. Societal Threats**

Somalis are divided into clans and sub clans. Clans play an important role in Somali politics the clan system existed and was a dominant factor influencing politics since the republic of Somalia was formed in 1960 and even before. However, it worsened with the state collapse followed by wars and the clan division which all revived tribalism (Said H. Mohamed, 2017).

Somalia is known to be a homogenous country where most clans and tribes practice the same culture and traditions. Adding a further point Somalia is ethnically, religiously, culturally and linguistically one of the most homogenous nations in the World, contrary to most African countries which are highly heterogeneous, and which are victims of their cultural diversity, Somalia remains the stun of them all. As pure reason would require, Somalia's homogenous society should be a powerful uniting factor since no clan or tribe can claim to have a better language and traditions than the other. Historically, the Somalis of today are said to have originated from the Hamitic tribes that lived or emigrated in the area (World Atlas, 2019). Furthermore, the people are so conservative that they would prefer to pay allegiance to their clans than to any central government. This explains why every Western type approach to unite the country has failed. As a matter of fact, the bigger clans are mostly controlled by powerful warlords (World Atlas, 2019) who act as the security actors and custodians of the values, interests and norms of the clans. Overcoming these warlords is no small trouble since most times, they enjoy the loyalty and support of their brethren.

Some of the tribes identified by this study which are scattered throughout the national territory of Somali are: Isaaq, Hawiye, Dir, Darod, Rahanweyn, Digil and Mirifle (World Atlas, 2019). There have been reports of non-Somalis leaving in Somalia who either identify with a separate identity or have adopted an indigenous Somali identity. These non-Somalis include, Arabs, Indians and Pakistanis who are said to be involved in petit trades, teaching and working in the banana plantations. Furthermore, there are multiple reports of other emigrants from the Bantu clan who surgn in Somalia (World Atlas, 2019). Therefore, it can be said that the Somali society is a kind of diverse and doesn't only contain its own indigens but despite the war and the collapsed nature of the state, there are foreigners who still seek greener pastures in the war torn country. Furthermore, seeing that the clans are all of the same ethnic line and ancestral origin, there are greater tendencies for inter clan partnerships and agreements on many things. Moreover, when these interclan partnerships are enacted and ratified, there is an enabling factor that the society in which its done will get stronger and socially bonded together. In that case, the objectives and leadership of the societies will most likely work together meaning any threat to their collective identities and securities will be handled collectively. As good as it sounds, it is also dangerous because the intention to retreat by one may directly threaten the other clan that might not entertain the idea. Thus, if the latter is stronger, it might impede the weaker from retreating meaning any attempt to make peace and enforce reconcillioation will be hampered.

Moving the argument along the 4.5 formula ruined the Somali politics and stability. This formula is a clan-based system that the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has established in 2000 the "4.5 formula" which seeks ensure that each of the four main clans (identified as the Hawiye, Darood, Dir, and Rahanweyn) be equally represented in government. The remaining "0.5" is intended to accommodate all groups that are not part of the main clans, i.e. minorities, women, civil society and other groups. However, this formula is highly disputed as a viable formula for conflict resolution in Somalia as reflected by the continued civil war (ACCORD, 2009). Therefore Somali minority clans suffer and those marginalized minorities are more likely to join the terrorist group and they are more vulnerable to radicalisation and terrorist groups recruitment.

### **D. Economic Threats**

From an economic point of view, Somalia during the stateless situation and the lack of efficient and competent national governance in Somalia, economic activities are being handled. The country also suffers from the deficiency of a formal institutional authority, informal economy mainly based on livestock, incorporation of tax free or low-taxed companies, companies of money transfer and telecommunications.

In Somalia, agriculture is the most significant sector that sustains Somalis employment and the country's economy. Somalia's economy based on livestock normally accounts for about 40% of GDP and more than 50% of export earnings. Large parts of the population are comprised of nomads and semi pastoralists, so their livelihoods are mainly dependent on the livestock. In 2014, after a permanent government was established Somalia witnessed an increase in the economy around 3.7% depending upon the growth of agriculture, construction and telecommunications sectors.

In recent years some developments such as a first gas station, several supermarkets and airline flights (especially to Turkey via Turkish Airlines) had taken its place in Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, since the collapse of the Siad Barre's regime and central government system. Furthermore, there are several markets in Mogadishu which also offer food, electronics etc. Moreover, investments in the service sector also augmented, there are hotels which still operate and are protected by private securities. These slight developments only took their place in Mogadishu where government officials and external powers are located such as African Union troops. Although it has some capacity of trade especially via ports, Somalia consists of great transportation capacity, but due to security concerns businesses do not prefer to invest.

In addition, the telecommunication system is one of the most developed sectors in Somalia. Telecommunication firms provide internet and wireless internet services in many major cities and also provide low call rates. Despite there is not any formal banking system yet, there are presently money remittance and transfer systems. As of now, it cannot take investment in order to further this system, again due to international concerns on security (CIA Factbook, 2018)

After the collapse of central government in 1991, state-building efforts didn't give a positive outcome and therefore, Somalis created their own means to survive and regulate businesses. Since there was a lack of formal institutions (even after they were

established, these institutions weren't competent enough to provide stable services). Somalis privatized approximately every sector from education to security. And according to Menkhaus, "the 'privatization of everything' in Somalia has created a largely unregulated economy in which criminal economic activity (such as smuggling and drug production) flourishes".

### **E. Environmental Threats**

According to UN report land degradation is a key environmental issue in Somalia, closely linked to desertification, drought and unsustainable livestock and agricultural practices. Food insecurity and livelihoods, possible hazardous waste, lack of marine and coastal management, and mitigation and management of natural disasters are also environmental concerns in Somalia, (UN report, 2005).

The climate and weather systems of the earth are constantly changing. Therefore this causes drought and famine in Somalia, which is a decline in food availability due to a reduction in production resulting from adverse weather. A drought is defined as "a period of abnormally dry weather sufficiently prolonged for the lack of water to cause a serious hydrologic imbalance in the affected area". And Famine is mass starvation, where whole communities are literally starving to death. In the last quarter-century, Somalia has undergone three periods of protracted drought and two periods of famine. A famine in 1992 killed nearly 300,000 people and displaced 1 out of 5 people.

Historical trends show droughts occurring regularly at intervals of 2-3 years in the Deyr (October-December) season and 8-10 years in consecutive Deyr and Gu (April-June) seasons, extending seasonal hardships. Records indicate that ten significant droughts occurred between 1918 and 1975, while droughts also occurred in 1979-80, 1983-86 and 1989-90.

By early 1992, it was estimated that between one-quarter and one-third of all children had died. During the 2011 East Africa Drought, more than a quarter of a million people died in Somalia, half of them children under the age of five. The drought resulted in 955,000 Somali refugees in neighboring countries and devastating economic losses to agriculture and livestock. It also brought famine to the south of the country.

The summer of 2011 produced one of the worst droughts in 60 years in the Horn of Africa, affecting Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti. Following several seasons of very low rainfall, there was a total failure of the October-December 2010 Deyr (or short) rains and the April-June 2011 Gu (or long) rains were meager, resulting in the worst annual crop production in 17 years, excess animal mortality, and very high food prices.

In late July 2011, the UN declared the situation in parts of southern Somalia to be a famine in which 3.7 million people – nearly half the country's population – faced a humanitarian crisis, but most of the issues facing the country were not new.

The fact that famine emerged in Somalia in mid-2011 serves as an example of the deadly effects of the combination of severe and prolonged drought, ballooning food and water prices, poor governance, ongoing conflict, and international response that was inadequate, for many reasons, to meet the needs of millions of people. By early August, the international community was trying to scale up operations in response to the famine and had begun airlifts of emergency food. But most of the starvation was occurring in the south, in areas largely inaccessible to international agencies. In fact, the two parts of Southern Somalia where famine was initially declared were controlled by al-Shabaab. The militants had forced out Western aid organizations in 2010 and even when famine was declared, few of these agencies were able to return quickly, (Barrow, 2017).

The risk of famine remains, and the cyclical droughts and increasingly erratic weather patterns continue to prevent the achievement of vital long-term development goals needed to lift Somalia out of poverty and insecurity. The impact of drought on the Somali people is compounded by an interrelated set of factors that include the environment, governance, conflict, displacement, and poverty.

Somalia is heavily reliant on its natural resource base and the provision of ecosystem services. The country's vulnerability to climate change is projected to increase due to its dependency on its natural resource base. This, coupled with the man-made degradation of natural resources due to charcoal production and overgrazing, has increased Somalia's vulnerability to drought and desertification, leading to a marked reduction in food security.

The 2011 famine in Somalia was not a natural phenomenon, but rather the product of human-made factors, including lack of governance, political instability, and conflict, which undermined traditional coping strategies that have evolved over generations in response to the natural hazard of drought. The best way of preventing famines is not simply a technical issue of coming up with better warning systems or aid delivery mechanisms but engaging in the far more difficult task of creating political systems capable of protecting and assisting their people when natural hazards occur.



Adding a further point, in Somalia, there are two rivers, the Jubba river which is 800 km and the Shabelle river 1500km, they both originate from Ethiopia along the border of Hiraan, and Gedo regions. Shabelle ends at Dhaytubako and the Jubba flows through the border with Ethiopia in Gedo region and passes through Dolow, Luq, Bardheere, Buale, Jilib, Jamame, and other cities. It ends at the Indian Ocean sea at a place called Goobweyn, about 25km from Kismayo.

According to the FAO report the water flow along the Juba and Shabelle decreases as the rivers flow downstream through Somalia, due mainly to factors such as: the minimal contribution of tributaries from the Somali catchment areas, “bank full” spillage of floodwater into the flood plains, natural and man-made flood relief channels, river diversions for irrigation during both low and high flow periods and natural losses due to evaporation and infiltration/recharge of the groundwater along the rivers.

Over the last two decades, the two big rivers created challenges rather than opportunities. A recent study by FAO the development and management of the Juba and Shabelle basins are faced with many challenges, which if not adequately addressed could derail the ongoing efforts to revive the agricultural sector. As the FAO stated these include, but are not limited to:

Insecurity and lack of Access, Sparse data/information, limited monitoring network, Lack of resources and Trans-boundary issues. The trans-boundary nature of the Juba and Shabelle drainage basins complicate proper planning, development, and management of the water resources. More than two-thirds of the joint Somali-Ethiopian drainage basin lies in Ethiopia. Some are in Kenya. However, there is little information available in Somalia on weather, river flows and abstractions in the upper catchments in Ethiopia. In early 2016, the Shabelle River in Somalia became dry, which is very unusual for that time of year. This opened a lot of speculation into the cause of the dry river, but no information was forthcoming from the Ethiopian side. Information sharing between the two countries would go a long way towards overcoming this challenge, (FAO report, 2016).

## V. CONCLUSION

Somalia is a country, situated in the Golden Horn of Africa, and its pending crises are such that even the international community couldn't solve its ongoing conflicts. This territory first witnessed the colonization period of Britain and Italy. Moreover, during the decolonization process of Africa, Somalia declared its independence as well but couldn't establish a proper state to govern the country. This deficiency and incompetency regarding the state establishment's root cause is the clan culture of Somalis. Today,

there are several areas in Somalia governed by the government, by Al-Shabaab, by autonomous zones such as Puntland and by independent zones such as Somaliland.

Furthermore, A government-centric governing model derived from the Western-based liberal culture which constitutes the democracy system remains another flaw. Nevertheless, Somalia possesses neither a western culture nor government culture. Therefore, the international community's state-building capacity development attempts always fail. The international community has equally failed because it couldn't understand the root causes of the conflicts and also the culture underlying it.

By virtue of the fact that the state establishment failed to build or to function, Somalis experienced the chaos and the violence along with it. The interim government was not sufficient for the mediation and reconciliation of the conflict parties. As a matter of fact, the interim governments such as, Transitional Federal Government, accelerated the conflicts and radicalized Islamist groups gained the impetus to arise resulting from failed security and political systems of the collapsed state. In the face of such a situation business cannot operate due to security concerns (Stremlau, 2018). Businesses that are willing to invest in the country first worry of its stability and the concept of stability can only be assured when its security systems function well. Since Somalia didn't have even a dysfunctional security system, Somalis privatized this sector.

National growth can only be sustained via a stable economy and a non-conflicting community. Since the state-building attempts didn't pay back sufficiently enough, local governments should be the ones who in focus. Somali culture is mainly based on clannism; therefore, by using these leverage municipals, local governance can be enforced under the control of the state. So, that each municipality or local governance would provide security and basic services that the state should provide. After a peace and order is provided to the country as a whole, national growth can augment. But in order to do that, Somalia must firstly, try to reconcile the conflicting clans, end terrorism, implement deterrent laws and punishment against kidnapping piracy and enforce maritime force in order to tackle the piracy problem.

Although Somalis had demonstrated development in state-building and economic growth, it is not enough to tackle with security issues. State development process is reciprocal that is it must work first for the country and then for the regime or government in power. If the current security challenges and conflicts are resolved, then national development will grow and also when national development grows then the security challenges will be resolved.

Although Somalia is recovering there is still challenges and in spite of tribalism, warlordism, terrorism and piracy Somali people are resilient and so lucky to have partner, friends and the International Community.

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